

### **3.1- AGING MANAGEMENT OF REACTOR VESSEL, INTERNALS, AND REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM**

#### **Review Responsibilities**

**Primary** - ~~Branch responsible for materials and chemical engineering~~ Branch assigned responsibility per SRP-LR section 3.0

~~**Secondary** - Branch responsible for mechanical engineering~~

#### **3.1.1 Areas of Review**

This review plan section addresses the aging management review (AMR) of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system. For a recent vintage plant, the information related to the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system is contained in Chapter 5, "Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems," of the plant's final safety analysis report (FSAR), consistent with the Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0800) (Ref. 1). For older plants, the location of applicable information is plant-specific because their FSAR may have predated NUREG-0800.

The reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system includes the reactor vessel and internals. Also included for BWRs are the reactor coolant recirculation system and portions of other systems connected to the pressure vessel extending to the first isolation valve outside of containment or to the first anchor point. These connected systems include residual heat removal, low-pressure core spray, high-pressure core spray, low-pressure coolant injection, high-pressure coolant injection, reactor core isolation cooling, isolation condenser, reactor coolant cleanup, feedwater, and main steam. For PWRs, the reactor coolant system includes the primary coolant loop, the pressurizer and pressurizer relief tank, and the steam generators. The connected systems for PWRs include the residual heat removal or low pressure injection system, core flood spray or safety injection tank, chemical and volume control system or high pressure injection system, and sampling system.

~~The staff has issued a generic aging lessons learned (GALL) report addressing aging management for license renewal (Ref. 2). The GALL report documents the staff's basis for determining whether generic existing programs are adequate to manage aging without change or generic existing programs should be augmented for license renewal. The GALL report may be referenced in a license renewal application and should be treated in the same manner as an approved topical report.~~

~~Because a license renewal applicant may or may not be able to reference the GALL report as explained below, the following areas are reviewed.~~

##### ~~**3.1.1.1 Aging Management Programs Evaluated in the GALL Report that Are Relied on for License Renewal**~~

~~The applicant may reference the GALL report in a license renewal application to demonstrate that the programs at its facility correspond to those reviewed and approved in the report and that no further staff review is required. If the material presented in the GALL report is applicable to the applicant's facility, the staff should find the applicant's reference to the report acceptable. In making this determination, the staff should consider whether the applicant has identified specific programs described and evaluated in the GALL report. The staff, however, should not repeat its review of the substance of the matters described in the report. Rather, the staff should~~

confirm that the applicant verifies that the approvals set forth in the GALL report for generic programs apply to the applicant's programs.

### **3.1.1.2 Further Evaluation of Aging Management as Recommended by the GALL Report**

The GALL report provides the basis for identifying those programs that warrant further evaluation during the staff review of a license renewal application. The staff review focus should be on augmented programs for license renewal.

The responsible review organization is to review the following LRA AMR and AMP items, assigned to it, per SRP-LR section 3.0, for review:

#### **AMRs**

- AMRs consistent with the GALL report, for which further evaluation is not recommended
- AMRs consistent with the GALL report, for which further evaluation is recommended
- AMRs not consistent with the GALL report

#### **AMPs**

- AMPs consistent with GALL AMPs
- Plant-specific AMPs

#### **FSAR Supplement**

- In addition, the responsible review organization is to review the FSAR supplement associated with each assigned AMP.

### **3.1.2 Acceptance Criteria**

The acceptance criteria for the areas of review describe methods for determining whether the applicant has met the requirements of the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 54.21.

#### **3.1.2.1 Aging Management Programs Evaluated in the GALL Report that Are Relied on for License Renewal AMR Results Consistent with the GALL Report for Which No Further Evaluation is Recommended**

Acceptable methods for managing aging of The aging management review and acceptable aging management programs applicable to the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system are described and evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL report (Ref. 2). In referencing this report, the applicant should indicate that the material presented is applicable to the specific plant involved and should provide the information necessary to adopt the finding of program acceptability as described and evaluated in the report. The applicant should also verify that the approvals set forth in the GALL report for generic programs apply to the applicant's programs. The applicant may reference appropriate programs as described and evaluated in the GALL report.

The applicant's LRA should provide sufficient information so that the NRC reviewer is able to confirm that the specific AMR line-item and the associated AMP are consistent with the cited GALL AMR line-item. The staff reviewer should then confirm that the LRA AMR line-item is consistent with the GALL line-item to which it is compared.

If the applicant identifies an exception to the cited GALL AMP, the LRA should include a basis or reference how the criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3) would still be met. The NRC reviewer

should then confirm that the AMP with all exceptions would satisfy the criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). If, while reviewing the AMP, the reviewer identifies a difference from the GALL AMP, this difference should be reviewed and dispositioned as if it was an exception identified by the applicant in its LRA. The disposition of all LRA-defined exceptions and staff-identified differences should be documented.

The LRA should identify any enhancements that are needed to permit an existing aging management program to be declared consistent with the GALL AMP to which the LRA AMP is compared. The reviewer is to confirm both that the enhancement, if implemented, would allow the existing plant aging management program to be consistent with the GALL AMP and also that the applicant has a commitment to implement the enhancement prior to the period of extended operation. The reviewer should document the disposition of all enhancements.

### **3.1.2.2 Further Evaluation of Aging Management as Recommended by the GALL Report AMR Results Consistent with the GALL Report for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended**

The GALL report indicates that further evaluation should be performed for the following. The basic acceptance criteria defined in 3.1.2.1 apply to all of the AMRs and AMPs reviewed as part of this section. In addition, if the GALL AMR line-item to which the LRA AMR line-item is compared identifies that "further evaluation is recommended," then additional criteria apply as identified by the GALL report for each of the following aging effect/aging mechanism combinations.

#### **3.1.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage (BWR/PWR)**

Fatigue is a time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. TLAA's are required to be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). The evaluation of this TLAA is addressed separately in Section 4.3.

#### **3.1.2.2.2 Loss of Material due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion (BWR/PWR)**

1. Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion could occur in the steel PWR steam generator shell assembly. The existing program relies on control of chemistry to mitigate corrosion and ISI to detect loss of material. The extent and schedule of the existing steam generator inspections are designed to ensure that flaws cannot attain a depth sufficient to threaten the integrity of the welds. However, according to NRC Information Notice (IN) 90-04 (Ref. 4), if general corrosion pitting of the shell exists, the program may not be sufficient to detect pitting and crevice corrosion. The GALL report recommends augmented inspection to manage this aging effect. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).
2. Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in stainless steel BWR isolation condenser components. General, pitting, and crevice corrosion could occur in steel BWR isolation condenser components. The existing program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate corrosion and on ASME Section XI inservice inspection (ISI). However, the existing program should be augmented to detect loss of material due to general, pitting or crevice corrosion. The GALL report recommends an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of the shell-side water, and eddy current testing of tubes to ensure that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### **3.1.2.2.3 Loss of Fracture Toughness due to Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement (BWR/PWR)**

1. Neutron irradiation embrittlement is a time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) to be evaluated for the period of extended operation for all ferritic materials that have a neutron fluence greater than  $401710^{17}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> (E > 1 MeV) at the end of the license renewal term. Certain aspects of neutron irradiation embrittlement are TLAA's as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. TLAA's are required to be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). The evaluation of this TLAA is addressed separately in Section 4.2.

2. ~~2.~~ Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement could occur in BWR and PWR the reactor vessels. A reactor vessel materials surveillance program monitors neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel. Reactor vessel surveillance programs are plant specific, depending on matters such as the composition of limiting materials, availability of surveillance capsules, and projected fluence levels. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, an applicant is required to submit its proposed withdrawal schedule for approval prior to implementation. Thus, further staff evaluation is required for license renewal. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).
3. Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling could occur in Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts and screws. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

~~3. Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling could occur in Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).~~

#### **3.1.2.2.4 ~~Crack Initiation and Growth~~Cracking due to Thermal and Mechanical or Cyclic Loading or Stress Corrosion Cracking (BWR/PWR)**

1. ~~1. Crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to thermal and mechanical loading, ~~or SCC stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and (including intergranular stress corrosion cracking [IGSCC])~~ could occur in small-bore stainless steel reactor coolant system and connected system piping less than NPS 4. The existing program relies on ASME Section XI ISI and on control of water chemistry to mitigate SCC. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific destructive examination or a nondestructive examination (NDE) that permits inspection of the inside surfaces of the piping be conducted to ensure that cracking has not occurred and the component intended function will be maintained during ~~the extended period~~the period of extended operation. The AMPs should be augmented by verifying that service-induced weld cracking is not occurring in the small-bore piping less than NPS 4, including pipe, fittings, and branch connections. A one-time inspection of a sample of locations is an acceptable method to ensure that the aging effect is not occurring and the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.
2. ~~2. Crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to ~~thermal and mechanical loading or cyclic loading or~~ SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in stainless steel and nickel alloy BWR reactor vessel flange leak detection line ~~and BWR jet pump sensing line~~. The GALL report recommends that a plant specific aging management program be evaluated to mitigate or detect ~~crack initiation and growth~~cracking due to SCC of vessel flange leak detection line. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).
3. ~~3. Crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to ~~thermal and mechanical loading or~~ SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in steel and stainless steel BWR isolation condenser components. The existing program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate SCC and on ASME Section XI inservice inspection (ISI). However, the existing program should be augmented to detect cracking due to SCC or cyclic loading. The GALL report recommends an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of

the shell-side water, and eddy current testing of tubes to ensure that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

4. Cracking due to cyclic loading could occur in the stainless steel BWR jet pump sensing lines. The GALL report recommends that a plant specific aging management program be evaluated to mitigate or detect cracking due to line. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### 3.1.2.2.5 Crack Growth due to Cyclic Loading (PWR)

Crack growth due to cyclic loading could occur in reactor vessel shell ~~and reactor coolant system piping and fittings~~. Growth of intergranular separations (underclad cracks) ~~in low alloy or carbon steel~~ heat affected zone under austenitic stainless steel cladding is a time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) to be evaluated for the period of extended operation for all the SA 508-CI 2 forgings where the cladding was deposited with a high heat input welding process. The methodology for evaluating the underclad flaw should be consistent with the current well-established flaw evaluation procedure and criterion in the ASME Section XI Code. See the Standard Review Plan, Section 4.7, "Other Plant-Specific Time-Limited Aging Analysis," for generic guidance for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c).

#### 3.1.2.2.6 ~~Cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC and/or loss of fracture toughness or change in dimensions due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling (PWR), and/or loss of preload due to stress relaxation~~ **Changes in Dimension due to Void Swelling (PWR)** Cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC or loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling (PWR), or change in dimension due to void swelling, or loss of preload due to stress relaxation

1. ~~Cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC~~ ~~Changes in dimension due to void swelling~~ could occur in reactor internal components. The existing program relies on control of water chemistry to mitigate SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC. However, the existing program should be augmented. The GALL report recommends ~~further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. The reactor vessel internals receive a visual inspection (VT-3) according to Category B-N-3 of Subsection IXB, ASME Section XI. This inspection is not sufficient to detect the effects of changes in dimension due to void swelling. GALL recommends~~ **maintaining water chemistry** and that the applicant provide a commitment which includes the following elements: (1) to participate in industry programs for investigating and managing aging effects applicable to Reactor Internals, (2) to evaluate and implement the results of the industry programs as applicable to the Reactor Internals design and, (3) to submit, for NRC review and approval an inspection plan for Reactor Internals, as based on industry recommendation, at least 24 months prior to the ~~extended~~ period of **extended operation**.
2. ~~Cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC~~ ~~;~~ **could occur in baffle former bolts, and** loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling, changes in dimensions due to void swelling, and loss of preload due to stress relaxation could occur in reactor internal components. The GALL report recommends that the applicant provide a ~~commitment which~~ **commitment which** includes the following elements: (1) to participate in industry programs for investigating and managing aging effects applicable to Reactor Internals, (2) to evaluate and implement the results of the industry programs as applicable to the Reactor Internals design and, (3) to submit, for NRC review and approval an inspection



plan for Reactor Internals, as based on industry recommendation, at least 24 months prior to the ~~extended~~ period of extended operation. ~~a plant-specific aging management program should be evaluated. The applicant provides a plant-specific AMP or participates in industry programs to investigate aging effects and determine appropriate AMP. Otherwise, the applicant provides the basis for concluding that void swelling is not an issue for the component. The applicant should either provide the basis for concluding that void swelling is not an issue for the component or provide a program to manage the effects of changes in dimension due to void swelling and the loss of ductility associated with swelling.~~

### **3.1.2.2.7- ~~Crack Initiation and Growth~~Cracking due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)**

1. ~~Crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to ~~SCC~~SCC could occur in the stainless steel reactor vessel flange leak detection line and ~~and primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) could occur in nickel alloy PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs), instrument tubes (bottom head penetrations), pressurizer spray heads, and nozzles for the steam generator instruments and drains nozzles and penetrations on the secondary side of the Steam Generator, The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects are adequately managed. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated because existing programs may not be capable of mitigating or detecting crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to SCC. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).
2. ~~Crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to SCC could occur in PWR cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) reactor coolant system ~~piping and fittings~~piping, piping components, and piping elements ~~and pressurizer surge line nozzle. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of piping that does not meet either~~either maintenance of the reactor water chemistry in accordance with the guidelines of TR-105714 ~~or and further evaluation for piping, piping components, and piping elements (other than valve bodies and pump casings) that do not meet the material guidelines of NUREG-0313 (Ref. 5). For piping, piping components, and piping elements (other than valve bodies and pump casings) that do not meet the NUREG-0313 guidelines, the GALL report recommends that the program include (a) adequate inspection methods to ensure detection of cracks, and (b) flaw evaluation methodology for CASS components that are susceptible to thermal aging embrittlement. For pump casings and valve bodies that do not meet the material guidelines of NUREG-0313 see Chapter XI.M1, "ASME Section XI, Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD."~~ Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).
3. ~~Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC could occur in PWR pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni alloys. The existing program relies on ASME Section XI ISI and on control of water chemistry to mitigate PWSCC. However, the existing program should be augmented to manage the effects of SCC on the intended function of Ni-alloy components. The GALL report recommends that the applicant provide a plant-specific AMP or participate in industry programs to determine appropriate AMP for PWSCC of Inconel 182 weld. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).~~

#### **3.1.2.2.8- ~~Crack Initiation and Growth~~Cracking due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)**

~~Crack initiation and growth~~Cracking due to SCC or IASCC could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. Historically the VT-3 visual examinations have not identified baffle/former bolt cracking because cracking occurs at the juncture of the bolt head and shank, which is not accessible for visual inspection. However, recent UT examinations of the baffle/former bolts at several plants have identified cracking. The industry is currently addressing the issue of baffle bolt cracking in the PWR Materials Reliability Project, Issues Task Group (ITG) activities to determine, develop, and implement the necessary steps and plans to manage the applicable aging effects on a plant-specific basis. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects are adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### **3.1.2.2.9 Loss of Preload due to Stress Relaxation (PWR)**

~~4.~~ Loss of preload due to stress relaxation could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. Visual inspection (VT-3) should be augmented to detect relevant conditions of stress relaxation because only the heads of the baffle/former bolts are visible, and a plant-specific aging management program is thus required. The GALL report recommends a plant-specific aging management program to ensure that these aging effects are adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### **3.1.2.2.10 Loss of Section Thickness due to Erosion (PWR)**

Loss of section thickness due to erosion could occur in steam generator feedwater impingement plates and supports. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of a plant-specific aging management program to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### **3.1.2.2.11- ~~Crack Initiation and Growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or Intergranular Attack or Loss of Material due to Wastage and Pitting Corrosion or Loss of Section Thickness due to Fretting and Wear or Denting due to Corrosion of Carbon Steel~~Steel Tube Support Plate (PWR)**

~~Denting due to corrosion of steel tube support plate could occur in PWR steam generator tubes. The GALL report recommends steam generator tube integrity and water chemistry programs. Furthermore, that f~~Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or intergranular attack (IGA) or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion or deformation due to corrosion could occur in alloy 600 components of the steam generator tubes, repair sleeves and plugs. All PWR licensees have committed voluntarily to a SG degradation management program described in NEI 97-06; these guidelines are currently under NRC staff review. The GALL report recommends that an AMP based on the recommendations of staff approved NEI 97-06 guidelines, or other alternate regulatory basis for SG degradation management, should be developed to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. ~~or for~~ plants where analyses were completed in response to NRC Bulletin 88-02 "Rapidly Propagating Cracks in SG Tubes," the results of those analyses are to be reconfirmed for the period of extended operation.



### 3.1.2.2.12 Loss of ~~Section Thickness~~~~Thickness~~Material due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion

Loss of ~~section thickness~~~~thickness~~Material due to flow-accelerated corrosion could occur in tube support lattice bars made of ~~carbon steel~~steel. The GALL report recommends that thea applicant provide a commitment to submit, for NRC review and approval, an inspection plan for tube support lattice bars as based upon staff approved NEI 97-06 guidelines, or other alternative regulatory basis for steam generator degradation management, at least 24 months prior to the ~~extended~~period of ~~extended operation~~.plant-specific aging management program be evaluated and, on the basis of the guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 97-06, an inspection program for steam generator internals be developed to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

### 3.1.2.2.13- Cracking due to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)

1. Cracking due to PWSCC could occur in PWR reactor coolant pressure boundary penetrations made of Ni alloys. The existing program relies on ASME Section XI ISI and on control of water chemistry to mitigate PWSCC. However, the existing program should be augmented to manage the effects of SCC on the intended function of Ni-alloy components. The GALL report recommends that the site review confirm that the plant-specific AMP is consistent with applicant commitments to NRC Orders, Bulletins and Generic Letters associated with nickel alloys.. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).
2. Cracking due to PWSCC could occur in nickel alloy PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs). and pressurizer spray heads. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects are adequately managed. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated for the pressurizer spray heads. For PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs) and pressurizer spray heads, the GALL report recommends that the applicant is to provide a plant-specific AMP or participate in industry programs to determine appropriate AMP.

### Ligament Cracking due to Corrosion (PWR)

Ligament cracking due to corrosion could occur in carbon steel components in the steam generator tube support plate. All PWR licensees have committed voluntarily to a SG degradation management program described in NEI 97-06; these guidelines are currently under NRC staff review. The GALL report recommends that an AMP based on the recommendations of staff approved NEI 97-06 guidelines, or other alternate regulatory basis for SG degradation management, be developed to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed.

### 3.1.2.2.14 Loss of Material due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion (PWR)

Loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion could occur in feedwater inlet ring and supports. As noted in Combustion Engineering (CE) Information Notice (IN) 90-04 and NRC IN 91-19 and LER 50-362/90-05-01, this form of degradation has been detected only in certain CE System 80 steam generators. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated because existing programs may not be capable of mitigating or detecting loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### 3.1.2.2.15 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position IQMB-1 (Appendix A.2 of this standard review plan).

#### 3.1.2.3 ~~Aging Management Evaluations that Are Different from or Not Addressed in the GALL Report~~ AMR Results Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in GALL Report

Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### 3.1.2.4 FSAR Supplement

The summary description of the programs and activities for managing the effects of aging for the period of extended operation in the FSAR supplement should be appropriate such that later changes can be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. The description should contain information associated with the bases for determining that aging effects will be managed during the period of extended operation. The description should also contain any future aging management activities, including enhancements, to be completed before the period of extended operation. Examples of the type of information required are provided in Table 3.1-2 of this standard review plan.

### 3.1.3 Review Procedures

For each area of review, the following review procedures are to be followed.

#### 3.1.3.1 ~~Aging Management Programs Evaluated in the GALL Report that Are Relied on for License Renewal~~ AMR Results Consistent with the GALL Report for which no Further Evaluation is Recommended

~~The applicant may reference the GALL report in its license renewal application, as appropriate. The staff should not repeat its review of the substance of the matters described in the report. If the applicant has provided the information necessary to adopt the finding of program acceptability as described and evaluated in the GALL report, the staff should find the applicant's reference to the report in a license renewal application acceptable. In making this determination, the reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided a brief description of the system, components, materials, and environment. The reviewer also verifies that the applicant has stated that the applicable aging effects and industry and plant specific operating experience have been reviewed by the applicant and are evaluated in the GALL report. The reviewer verifies that the applicant has identified those aging effects for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system components that are contained in the report as applicable to its plant. In addition, the reviewer ensures that the applicant has stated that the plant programs covered by the applicant's reference contain the same program elements that the staff evaluated and relied upon in approving the corresponding generic program in the GALL report.~~

~~The reviewer should verify that the applicant has stated that certain of its AMPs contain the same program elements as the corresponding generic program described in the GALL report and upon which the staff relied in its evaluation. The reviewer should also verify that the applicant has stated that the GALL report is applicable to its plant with respect to these programs. The reviewer verifies that the applicant has identified the appropriate programs as~~

~~described and evaluated in the GALL report. Programs evaluated in the report regarding the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system components are summarized in Table 3.1-1 of this review plan. No further staff evaluation is necessary if so recommended in the GALL report.~~

The applicant may reference the GALL report in its license renewal application, as appropriate, to demonstrate that the aging management reviews and programs at its facility are consistent with those reviewed and approved in the GALL report. The reviewer should not conduct a re-review of the substance of the matters described in the GALL report. If the applicant has provided the information necessary to adopt the finding of program acceptability as described and evaluated in the GALL report, the staff should find acceptable the applicant's reference to GALL in its license renewal application. In making this determination, the reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided a brief description of the system, components, materials, and environment. The reviewer also confirms that the applicant has stated that the applicable aging effects and industry and plant-specific operating experience have been reviewed by the applicant and are evaluated in the GALL Report.

Furthermore, the reviewer should confirm that the applicant has addressed operating experience identified after the issuance of the GALL report. Performance of this review requires the reviewer to confirm that the applicant has identified those aging effects for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system components that are contained in GALL as applicable to its plant.

The reviewer confirms that the applicant has identified the appropriate AMPs as described and evaluated in the GALL report. If the applicant commits to an enhancement to make its aging management program consistent with a GALL AMP, then the reviewer is to confirm that this enhancement when implemented will indeed make the LRA AMP consistent with the GALL AMP. If an aging management program in the LRA identifies an exception to the GALL AMP to which it is claiming to be consistent, the reviewer is to confirm that the LRA AMP with the exception will satisfy the criteria of 10CFR54.21(a)(3). If the reviewer identifies a difference, not identified by the LRA, between the LRA AMP and the GALL AMP, to which the LRA claims to be consistent, the reviewer should confirm that the LRA AMP with this difference satisfies 10CFR54.21(a)(3). The reviewer should document the basis for accepting enhancements, exceptions or differences. The AMPs evaluated in GALL pertinent to the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system components are summarized in Table 3.1-1 of this standard review plan.

### **~~3.1.3.2 Further Evaluation of Aging Management as Recommended by the GALL Report~~ AMR Results Consistent with the GALL Report for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended**

The basic review procedures defined in 3.1.3.1 apply to all of the AMRs and AMPs provided in this section. In addition, if the GALL AMR line-item to which the LRA AMR line-item is compared identifies that "further evaluation is recommended," then additional criteria apply as identified by the GALL report for each of the following aging effect/aging mechanism combinations.

#### **3.1.3.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage (BWR/PWR)**

Fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. TLAAs are required to be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). The staff reviews the evaluation of this TLAA separately following the guidance in Section 4.3 of this standard review plan.

#### **3.1.3.2.2 Loss of Material due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion (BWR/PWR)**

1. The GALL report recommends further evaluation for the management of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion of the steel PWR steam generator shell assembly. The existing program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate corrosion and on ISI for detection. Based on NRC IN 90-04 (Ref. 4), if general corrosion, pitting, and crevice corrosion of the shell exists, the existing program requirements may not be sufficient to detect loss of material due to these effects, and additional inspection procedures may be required. The reviewer verifies on a case-by-case basis that the applicant has proposed a program that will manage loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion by providing enhanced inspection and supplemental methods to detect loss of material and ensure that the component intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

2. The GALL report recommends an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of the shell-side water and eddy current testing of tubes for the management of loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion in BWR isolation condenser components. The existing program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate corrosion and on ASME Section XI ISI for detection. However, the inspection requirements should be augmented to detect loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion, and an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of the shell-side water and eddy current testing of tubes is recommended to ensure that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation. The reviewer verifies on a case-by-case basis that the applicant has proposed an augmented program that will manage loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion and ensure that the component intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

#### **3.1.3.2.3- Loss of Fracture Toughness due to Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement (BWR/PWR)**

1. Neutron irradiation embrittlement is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. TLAAs are required to be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). The staff reviews the evaluation of this TLAA following the guidance in Section 4.2 of this standard review plan.
2. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of the reactor vessel materials surveillance program for the period of extended operation. Neutron embrittlement of the reactor vessel is monitored by a reactor vessel materials surveillance program. Reactor vessel surveillance programs are plant specific, depending on matters such as the composition of limiting materials, availability of surveillance capsules, and projected fluence levels. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, an applicant must submit its proposed withdrawal schedule for approval prior to implementation. Thus, further staff evaluation is required for license renewal. The reviewer verifies on a case-by-case basis that the applicant has proposed an adequate reactor vessel materials surveillance program for the period of extended operation. Specific criteria for an acceptable AMP are provided in chapter XI, Section M31 of the GALL report.

3. The GALL report recommends further evaluation for the management of loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling of Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts and screws. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### 3.1.3.2.4- ~~Crack Initiation and Growth~~Cracking due to Thermal and Mechanical or Cyclic Loading or Stress Corrosion Cracking (BWR/PWR)

1. ~~4.~~—The GALL report recommends a plant-specific destructive examination or a nondestructive examination (NDE) that permits inspection of the inside surfaces of the stainless steel piping for the management of ~~crack initiation and growth~~cracking due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC of small-bore reactor coolant system and connected system piping (less than NPS 4). The existing program should be augmented by verifying that service-induced weld cracking is not occurring in the small-bore piping less than NPS 4, including pipe, fittings, and branch connections. See Chapter XI.M32, "One-Time Inspection" for an acceptable verification method. The GALL report recommends that the inspection include a representative sample of the system population, and, where practical and prudent, focus on the bounding or lead components most susceptible to aging due to time in service, severity of operating conditions, and lowest design margin. For small-bore piping, actual inspection locations should be based on physical accessibility, exposure levels, NDE examination techniques, and locations identified in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Information Notice (IN) 97-46. Combinations of NDE, including visual, ultrasonic, and surface techniques, are performed by qualified personnel following procedures consistent with the ASME Code and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. For small-bore piping less than NPS 4 in., including pipe, fittings, and branch connections, a plant-specific destructive examination or NDE that permits inspection of the inside surfaces of the piping should be conducted to ensure that cracking has not occurred. Follow-up of unacceptable inspection findings should include expansion of the inspection sample size and locations. The inspection and test techniques prescribed by the program should verify any aging effects because these techniques, used by qualified personnel, have been proven effective and consistent with staff expectations. The staff reviews to confirm that the program includes measures to verify that unacceptable degradation is not occurring, thereby validating the effectiveness of existing programs or confirming that there is no need to manage aging-related degradation for the period of extended operation. If an applicant proposes a one-time inspection of select components and susceptible locations to ensure that corrosion is not occurring, the reviewer verifies that the proposed inspection will be performed using techniques similar to ASME Code and ASTM standards including visual, ultrasonic, and surface techniques (Refs. 6 and 7) to ensure that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.
2. ~~2.~~—The GALL report recommends that a plant specific aging management program be evaluated for the management of ~~crack initiation and growth~~cracking due to ~~thermal and mechanical loading or cyclic loading or~~ SCC (including IGSCC) in stainless steel and nickel alloy BWR reactor vessel flange leak detection line ~~and BWR jet pump sensing line~~. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.
3. ~~3.~~—The GALL report recommends an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of the shell-side water, and eddy current testing of tubes for the management of ~~crack initiation and growth~~cracking due to ~~thermal and mechanical~~



~~loading or~~ SCC (including IGSCC) of the ~~steel and stainless steel~~ BWR isolation condenser components. The existing program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate SCC and on ASME Section XI inservice inspection (ISI) to detect leakage. However, the existing program should be augmented to detect cracking due to SCC or cyclic loading. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

4. The GALL report recommends that a plant specific aging management program be evaluated for the management of cracking due to cyclic loading in stainless steel BWR jet pump sensing line. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### 3.1.3.2.5 Crack Growth due to Cyclic Loading (PWR)

The GALL report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage crack growth due to cyclic loading in reactor vessel shell and reactor coolant system ~~piping and fittings~~ ~~piping, piping components, and piping elements~~. Growth of intergranular separations (underclad cracks) in ~~low alloy or carbon steel~~ ~~steel~~ heat affected zone under austenitic stainless steel cladding is a time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) to be evaluated for the period of extended operation for all the SA 508-CI 2 forgings where the cladding was deposited with a high heat input welding process. The methodology for evaluating the underclad flaw should be consistent with the current well-established flaw evaluation procedure and criterion in the ASME Section XI Code. The Standard Review Plan, Section 4.7, "Other Plant-Specific Time-Limited Aging Analysis," provides generic guidance for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c). The staff reviews the evaluation of this TLAA separately following the guidance in Section 4.7 of this standard review plan.

#### 3.1.3.2.6 ~~Cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC and/or loss of fracture toughness or change in dimensions due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling (PWR), and/or loss of preload due to stress relaxation~~ ~~Changes in Dimension due to Void Swelling (PWR)~~ Cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC or loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling (PWR), or change in dimension due to void swelling, or loss of preload due to stress relaxation

1. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage ~~cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC of changes in dimension due to void swelling for~~ reactor internal components. ~~Changes in dimension due to void swelling could occur in reactor internal components. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. The reactor vessel internals receive a visual inspection (VT-3) according to Category B-N-3 of Subsection IWB, ASME Section XI. This inspection is not sufficient to detect the effects of changes in dimension due to void swelling. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of a plant specific aging management program: maintaining water chemistry and that the applicant provide a commitment which includes the following elements: (1) to participate in industry programs for investigating and managing aging effects applicable to Reactor Internals, (2) to evaluate and implement the results of the industry programs as applicable to the Reactor Internals design and, (3) to submit, for NRC review and approval an inspection plan for Reactor Internals, as based on industry recommendation, at least 24 months prior to entering the period of extended operation. The applicant should provide a plant specific AMP or participate in industry programs to~~



~~investigate aging effects and determine an appropriate AMP. Otherwise, the applicant should provide the basis for concluding that void swelling is not an issue for the component. The applicant should either provide the basis for concluding that void swelling is not an issue for the component or provide a program to manage the effects of changes in dimension due to void swelling and the loss of ductility associated with swelling. The reviewer verifies on a case-by-case basis that the applicant has either proposed a program to manage changes in dimension due to void swelling in the pressure vessel internal components or provided the basis for concluding that void swelling is not an issue. a commitment which includes the specified elements.~~

2. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage cracking due to SCC, PWSCC, and IASCC, ~~in baffle former bolts, and~~ loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling, changes in dimensions due to void swelling, and loss of preload due to stress relaxation in reactor internal components. The GALL report recommends that the applicant provide a commitment which includes the following elements: (1) to participate in industry programs for investigating and managing aging effects applicable to Reactor Internals, (2) to evaluate and implement the results of the industry programs as applicable to the Reactor Internals design and, (3) to submit, for NRC review and approval an inspection plan for Reactor Internals, as based on industry recommendation, at least 24 months prior to entering the period of extended operation. The reviewer verifies on a case-by-case basis that the applicant has provided a commitment which includes the specified elements.

### **~~3.1.3.2.7- Crack Initiation and Growth~~Cracking due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)**

1. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program is to be evaluated to manage ~~crack initiation and growth~~cracking due to ~~SCC and primary water~~ stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in stainless steel PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs, instrument tubes (bottom head penetrations), pressurizer spray heads, and nozzles for the steam generator secondary side instruments and drains and in the nickel alloy PWR reactor vessel flange leak detection line.- The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.
2. The GALL report recommends maintenance of reactor water chemistry in accordance with the guidelines of TR-105714 and further evaluation for CASS piping, piping components, and piping elements (other than valve bodies and pump casings) that do not meet the material guidelines of NUREG-0313 (Ref. 5). For piping, piping components, and piping elements that do not meet the NUREG-0313 guidelines, the GALL report recommends that the program include (a) adequate inspection methods to ensure detection of cracks, and (b) flaw evaluation methodology for CASS components that are susceptible to thermal aging embrittlement. For pump casings and valve bodies that do not meet the material guidelines of NUREG-0313 see Chapter XI.M1, "ASME Section XI, Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD."The GALL report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage crack initiation and growth due to SCC of PWR cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) reactor coolant system piping and fittings and pressurizer surge line nozzle.- The GALL report recommends further evaluation of piping that does not meet either the reactor water chemistry guidelines of TR-105714 or material guidelines of NUREG-0313 (Ref. 5). The staff

reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

~~3. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC of PWR pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni alloys. The existing program relies on ASME Section XI ISI to detect cracks and on control of water chemistry to mitigate PWSCC. However, the program should be augmented to manage the effects of SCC on the intended function of Ni-alloy components. The GALL report recommends the applicant provides a plant-specific AMP or participate in industry programs to determine appropriate AMP for PWSCC of Inconel 182 weld. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.~~

#### **3.1.3.2.8- Crack Initiation and GrowthCracking due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)**

The GALL report recommends further evaluation of ~~crack initiation and growth~~cracking due to SCC or IASCC in Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts. Historically the VT-3 visual examinations have not identified baffle/former bolt cracking because cracking occurs at the juncture of the bolt head and shank, which is not accessible for visual inspection. However, recent UT examinations of the baffle/former bolts at several plants have identified cracking. The industry is currently addressing the issue of baffle bolt cracking in the PWR Materials Reliability Project ITG activities to determine, develop, and implement the necessary steps and plans to manage the applicable aging effects on a plant-specific basis. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### **3.1.3.2.9 Loss of Preload due to Stress Relaxation (PWR)**

The GALL report recommends further evaluation of loss of preload due to stress relaxation ~~that~~ could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. Visual inspection (VT-3) should be augmented to detect relevant conditions of stress relaxation because only the heads of the baffle/former bolts are visible, and a plant-specific aging management program is thus required. The GALL report recommends a plant-specific aging management program to ensure that these aging effects are adequately managed. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### **3.1.3.2.10 Loss of Section Thickness due to Erosion (PWR)**

The GALL report recommends further evaluation of a plant-specific aging management program for the management of loss of section thickness due to erosion of steam generator feedwater impingement plates and supports. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### **3.1.3.2.11- Crack Initiation and Growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or Intergranular Attack or Loss of Material due to Wastage and Pitting Corrosion or Loss of Section Thickness due to Fretting and Wear or Denting due to Corrosion of Carbon SteelSteel Tube Support Plate (PWR)**

The GALL report recommends further evaluation of denting of steam generator tubes due to corrosion of steel tube support plates in PWR steam generators. The GALL report recommends steam generator tube integrity and water chemistry programs. Furthermore that for plants where analyses were completed in response to NRC Bulletin 88-02 "Rapidly Propagating Cracks in SG Tubes," the results of those analyses are to be reconfirmed for the period of extended operation. (1) crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, ODS CC, or intergranular attack (IGA); or (2) loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion; or (3) deformation due to corrosion in alloy 600 components of the steam generator tubes, repair sleeves, and plugs. All PWR licensees have committed voluntarily to a SG degradation management program described in NEI 97-06; these guidelines are currently under NRC staff review. The GALL report recommends that an AMP based on the recommendations of staff-approved NEI 97-06 guidelines, or other alternate regulatory basis for SG degradation management, be developed to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program analyses on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects during the period of extended operation.

#### 3.1.3.2.12 Loss of Section Thickness Material due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion

The GALL report recommends further evaluation of loss of section thickness due to flow-accelerated corrosion of the tube support lattice bars made of carbon steel. The GALL report recommends a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated and on the basis of the guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 97-06, an inspection program for steam generator internals should be developed to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### 3.1.3.2.13 Cracking due to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)

1. The GALL report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage cracking due to PWSCC of PWR pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni alloys. The existing program relies on ASME Section XI ISI to detect cracks and on control of water chemistry to mitigate PWSCC. However, the program should be augmented to manage the effects of SCC on the intended function of Ni-alloy components. The GALL report recommends the applicant provides a plant-specific AMP or participate in industry programs to determine appropriate AMP for PWSCC of Inconel 182 weld. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.
2. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program is to be evaluated to manage cracking due to SCC and primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs). and the PWR pressurizer spray heads. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects. The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated for the pressurizer spray heads. For PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs) and pressurizer spray heads, the GALL report recommends that the applicant is to provide a plant-specific AMP or participate in industry programs to determine appropriate AMP. Acceptance criteria are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).Cracking due to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWR)

#### Ligament Cracking due to Corrosion (PWR)

~~The GALL report recommends further evaluation of ligament cracking due to corrosion in carbon steel components in the steam generator tube support plate. All PWR licensees have committed voluntarily to a SG degradation management program described in NEI 97-06; these guidelines are currently under NRC staff review. The GALL report recommends that an AMP based on the recommendations of staff-approved NEI 97-06 guidelines, or other alternate regulatory basis for SG degradation management, be developed to ensure that this aging effect is adequately managed. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.~~

#### **3.1.3.2.14 Loss of material due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion (PWR)**

The GALL report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated to manage loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion in the feedwater inlet ring and supports. As noted in Combustion Engineering (CE) Information Notice (IN) 90-04 and NRC IN 91-19 and LER 50-362/90-05-01, this form of degradation has been detected only in certain CE System 80 steam generators. The staff reviews the applicant's proposed program on a case-by-case basis to ensure that an adequate program will be in place for the management of these aging effects.

#### **3.1.3.2.15 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components**

The applicant's aging management programs for license renewal should contain the elements of corrective actions, the confirmation process, and administrative controls. Safety-related components are covered by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, which is adequate to address these program elements. However, Appendix B does not apply to nonsafety-related components that are subject to an AMR for license renewal. Nevertheless, the applicant has the option to expand the scope of its 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B program to include these components and address the associated program elements. If the applicant chooses this option, the reviewer verifies that the applicant has documented such a commitment in the FSAR supplement. If the applicant chooses alternative means, the branch responsible for quality assurance should be requested to review the applicant's proposal on a case-by-case basis.

#### **3.1.3.3- Aging Management Evaluations that Are Different from or Not Addressed in the GALL Report AMR Results Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in GALL Report**

The reviewer should confirm that the applicant, in the license renewal application, has identified applicable aging effects, listed the appropriate combination of materials and environments, and aging management programs that will adequately manage the aging effects. The aging management program credited could be an AMP that is described and evaluated in the GALL report or a plant-specific program. Review procedures are described in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 (Appendix A.1 of this standard review plan).

#### **3.1.3.4 FSAR Supplement**

The reviewer ~~verifies~~ confirms that the applicant has provided information, equivalent to that in Table 3.1-2, in the FSAR supplement for aging management of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system for license renewal. The reviewer also ~~verifies~~ confirms that the applicant has provided information, equivalent to that in Table 3.1-2, in the FSAR supplement for Subsection 3.1.3.3, "Aging Management Evaluations that Are Different from or Not Addressed in the GALL Report."

The staff expects to impose a license condition on any renewed license to require the applicant to update its FSAR to include this FSAR supplement at the next update required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). As part of the license conditions, until the FSAR update is complete, the applicant may make changes to the programs described in its FSAR supplement without prior NRC approval, provided that the applicant evaluates each such change pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59.

As noted in Table 3.1-2, an applicant need not incorporate the implementation schedule into its FSAR. However, the reviewer should ~~verify~~ confirm that the applicant has identified and committed in the license renewal application to any future aging management activities to be completed before the period of extended operation. The staff expects to impose a license condition on any renewed license to ensure that the applicant will complete these activities no later than the committed date.

### 3.1.4 Evaluation Findings

The reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided sufficient information to satisfy the provisions of this review plan section, and the staff's evaluation supports conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:

~~The staff concludes that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system will be adequately managed so that there is reasonable assurance that these systems will perform their intended functions in accordance with the current licensing basis during the period of extended operation. The staff also concludes that the FSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the programs and activities for managing the effects of aging for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system as reflected in the license conditions.~~

On the basis of its review, the staff concludes that the applicant has adequately identified the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing these aging effects for the reactor vessel, internals and reactor coolant system, such that there is reasonable assurance that the component intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff also reviewed the applicable FSAR supplement program descriptions and concludes that the FSAR supplement provides an adequate program description of the AMPs credited for managing aging effects, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.1.5 Implementation

Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the NRC's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evaluation of conformance with NRC regulations.

### 3.1.6 References

1. NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1981.
2. NUREG-1801, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 2001.

3. NEI 97-06, "Steam Generator Program Guidelines," Nuclear Energy Institute, December 1997.
4. NRC Information Notice 90-04, "Cracking of the Upper Shell-to-Transition Cone Girth Welds in Steam Generators," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 26, 1990.
5. NUREG-0313, Rev. 2, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BRW Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1988.
6. EPRI TR-107569-V1R5, "PWR Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Rev. 5," Electric Power Research Institute September 1997.
7. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.83, "Inservice Inspection of Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Tubes," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1974.



8. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.121, "Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator Tubes (for Comment)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1976.
9. NRC Generic Letter 95-05, "Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 3, 1995.
10. NRC Information Notice 90-10, "Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 23, 1990.
11. NRC Information Notice 90-30, "Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Welds," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1, 1990.
12. NRC Generic Letter 89-08, "Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning," May 2, 1989.
13. NSAC-202L-R2, "Recommendations for an Effective Flow-accelerated Corrosion Program," Electric Power Research Institute, April 1999.
14. NRC Information Notice 96-11, "Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increase Potential for Stress Corrosion Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations," February 14, 1996.
15. NRC Generic Letter 97-06, "Degradation of Steam Generator Internals," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 30, 1997.
16. BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515), *BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines-Revision 3, Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry*, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 1994.
17. EPRI NP-5769, *Degradation and Failure of Bolting in Nuclear Power Plants*, Volumes 1 and 2, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April 1988.
18. EPRI TR-105714, *PWR primary Water Chemistry Guidelines-Revision 3*, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, Nov. 1995.
19. NRC Generic Letter 88-01, *NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping*, January 25, 1988.
20. NRC Generic Letter 97-01, *Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations*, April 1, 1997.
21. NRC Information Notice 97-46, *Unisolable Crack in High-Pressure Injection Piping*, July 9, 1997.
22. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2, *Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials*, May 1988.
23. NUREG-0619, *BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1980.

24. NUREG-1339, *Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 29: Bolting Degradation or Failure in Nuclear Power Plants*, Richard E. Johnson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1990.
25. EPRI TR-104213, *Bolted Joint Maintenance & Application Guide*, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December 1995.
26. NEI letter dated Dec. 11, 1998, Dave Modeen to Gus Lainas, "Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) on GL 97-01."

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
BWR/ PWR	Reactor coolant pressure boundary components, closure bolting, support skirts, steam generator components, and reactor vessel internals	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	Yes, TLAA (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.1)	3.1.2.2.1	R-04 R-13 R-18 R-189 R-28 R-33 R-45 R-46 R-53 R-54 R-70 R-73 R-91
PWR	Steam generator shell assembly	Loss of material due to General, pitting and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	Yes, detection of aging effects is to be further evaluated (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.2.1)	3.1.2.2.2.1	R-34
BWR	Isolation condenser tube side components	Loss of material due to General, pitting and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry, and plant-specific verification program	Yes, detection of aging effects is to be further evaluated (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.2.2)	3.1.2.2.2.2	R-16
BWR/ PWR	Reactor vessel beltline shell, nozzles, and welds	Loss of fracture toughness due to Neutron irradiation embrittlement	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of 10 CFR 50 and RG 1.99	Yes, TLAA (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.3.1)	3.1.2.2.3.1	R-62 R-67 R-81 R-84
BWR/ PWR	Reactor vessel beltline shell and welds	Loss of fracture toughness due to Neutron irradiation embrittlement	Reactor vessel surveillance	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.3.2)	3.1.2.2.3.2	R-63 R-82 R-86
PWR	Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) baffle/former bolts	Loss of fracture toughness due to Neutron irradiation embrittlement	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.3.3)	3.1.2.2.3.3	R-128

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
	and screws	Loss of fracture toughness due to Neutron irradiation embrittlement, void swelling	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.3.3)	3.1.2.2.3.3	R-200
BWR/ PWR	Small-bore reactor coolant system and connected systems piping	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking and intergranular stress corrosion cracking	Inservice Inspection, Water chemistry, and a plant specific examination	Yes, parameters monitored/inspected and detection of aging effects are to be further evaluated (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.4.1)	3.1.2.2.4.1	R-02 R-03
		Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking and thermal and mechanical loading	Inservice Inspection and a plant specific examination (one-time inspection)	Yes, parameters monitored/inspected and detection of aging effects are to be further evaluated (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.4.1)	3.1.2.2.4.1	R-55 R-57
BWR/ PWR	Jet pump sensing line and reactor vessel flange leak detection line	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.4.2)	3.1.2.2.4.2	R-61
BWR	Isolation condenser tube side components	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	Inservice inspection; water chemistry, and plant-specific verification program	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.4.3)	3.1.2.2.4.3	R-15
BWR/ PWR	Jet pump sensing line and reactor vessel flange leak detection line	Cracking due to Cyclic loading	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.4.4)	3.1.2.2.4.4	R-102

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
PWR	Vessel shell fabricated of SA508-CI 2 forgings clad with stainless steel using a high-heat- input welding process	Crack growth due to Cyclic loading	TLAA	Yes, TLAA (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.5)	3.1.2.2.5	R-85
PWR	Vessel internals (except Westinghous e and B&W baffle former bolts)	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, irradiation- assisted stress corrosion cracking	Water chemistry and RVI program commitment	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.6.1)	3.1.2.2.6.1	R-106 R-109 R-116 R-120 R-123 R-130 R-138 R-143 R-146 R-149 R-155 R-159 R-166 R-172 R-173 R-175 R-176 R-180 R-181 R-185 R-186 R-193 R-194 R-202 R-203 R-209 R-210 R-214

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
		Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, primary water stress corrosion cracking, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking	Water chemistry and RVI program commitment	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.6.1)	3.1.2.2.6.1	R-112 R-118 R-133 R-150 R-162 R-167
PWR	Vessel internals (except Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts)	Changes in dimensions due to Void swelling	RVI program commitment	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.6.2)	3.1.2.2.6.2	R-107 R-110 R-113 R-117 R-119 R-121 R-124 R-126 R-131 R-134 R-139 R-144 R-147 R-151 R-158 R-160 R-163 R-168 R-174 R-177 R-182 R-187 R-195 R-199 R-204 R-211 R-215



**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
		Loss of fracture toughness due to Neutron irradiation embrittlement, void swelling	RVI program commitment	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.6.2)	3.1.2.2.6.2	R-122 R-127 R-132 R-135 R-141 R-157 R-161 R-164 R-169 R-178 R-188 R-196 R-205 R-212 R-216
		Loss of preload due to Stress relaxation	RVI program commitment	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.6.2)	3.1.2.2.6.2	R-108 R-114 R-136 R-137 R-154 R-165 R-184 R-192 R-197 R-207 R-213
	Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking	RVI program commitment	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.6.2)	3.1.2.2.6.2	R-125
PWR	Steam Generator secondary side nozzles and penetrations and Reactor vessel flange leak detection line	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.7.1)	3.1.2.2.7.1	R-36 R-74

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
PWR	Cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) reactor coolant system piping, piping components, and piping elements	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking	Water chemistry (and plant specific for components that do not meet the material guidelines of NUREG-0313).	Yes, plant specific for components that do not meet the material guidelines of NUREG-0313 (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.7.2)	3.1.2.2.7.2	R-05 R-09
PWR	Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking	Plant specific baffle/former bolt program	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.8)	3.1.2.2.8	R-198
PWR	Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts and screws	Loss of preload due to Stress relaxation	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.9)	3.1.2.2.9	R-129 R-201
PWR	Steam generator feedwater impingement plate and support	Loss of section thickness due to Erosion	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.10)	3.1.2.2.10	R-39
PWR	Steam generator tubes	Denting due to Corrosion of steel tube support plate	Steam generator tubing integrity; water chemistry and plant specific reconfirmation of tube crack propagation analyses.	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.11)	3.1.2.2.11	R-43

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
PWR	Tube support lattice bars made of steel	Loss of material due to Flow-accelerated corrosion	Applicant must provide a commitment to submit, for NRC review and approval, an inspection plan for tube support lattice bars as based upon staff approved NEI 97-06 guidelines, or other alternative regulatory basis for steam generator degradation manageme	No but Licensee commitment to be confirmed, (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.12)	3.1.2.2.12	R-41
PWR	PWR Nickel alloy reactor coolant pressure boundary penetrations and pressurizer heater sheaths and sleeves	Cracking due to Primary water stress corrosion cracking	Inservice inspection, water chemistry, and a plant-specific program consistent with applicant commitments to NRC Orders, Bulletins and Generic Letters associated with nickel alloys.	Yes, site review of plant-specific AMP. (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.13.1)	3.1.2.2.13.1	R-01 R-06 R-75 R-89 R-90
PWR	PWR core support pads/guide lugs, pressurizer spray heads	Cracking due to Primary water stress corrosion cracking	Plant specific	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.13.2)	3.1.2.2.13.2	R-24 R-88

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
PWR (CE)	Steam generator feedwater inlet ring and supports	Loss of material due to Flow-accelerated corrosion	Combustion Engineering (CE) System 80 steam generator feedwater ring inspection	Yes, plant specific (See Subsection 3.1.2.2.14)	3.1.2.2.14	R-51
BWR	Core shroud and core plate access hole cover (welded and mechanical covers)	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	No	NA	R-95
			Inservice inspection, water chemistry, and augmented inspection of the access hole cover welds	No	NA	R-94
	Core shroud and core plate, support structure, top guide, core spray lines and spargers, jet pump assemblies, control rod drive housing, nuclear instrumentation guide tubes	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	BWR vessel internals; water chemistry	No	NA	R-104
		Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking	BWR vessel internals; water chemistry	No	NA	R-100 R-92 R-93 R-96 R-97 R-98 R-99
	Feedwater and control rod drive (CRD) return line nozzles	Cracking due to Cyclic loading	Feedwater nozzle; CRD return line nozzle	No	NA	R-65 R-66

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
	Instrumentation Intermediate range monitor (IRM) dry tubes Source range monitor (SRM) dry tubes Incore neutron flux monitor guide tubes	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking	BWR vessel internals; water chemistry	No	NA	R-105
	Jet pump assembly castings; orificed fuel support	Loss of fracture toughness due to Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	No	NA	R-101 R-103
	Penetrations	Cracking due to stress corrosion cracking, Intergranular stress corrosion cracking, cyclic loading	BWR penetrations; water chemistry	No	NA	R-69
	Piping, piping components, and piping elements	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	BWR stress corrosion cracking and Water Chemistry	No	NA	R-22 R-68
	Unclad top head and nozzles	Loss of material due to General, pitting and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	No	NA	R-59

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
	Vessel shell attachment welds	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	BWR vessel ID attachment welds; water chemistry	No	NA	R-64
BWR/ PWR	BWR/PWR Piping, piping components, and piping elements; PWR steam generator components	Loss of material due to Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	No	NA	R-23 R-37 R-38
	CASS piping	Loss of fracture toughness due to Thermal aging embrittlement	Thermal aging embrittlement of CASS	No	NA	R-52 R-77
	CASS pump casing and valve body	Loss of fracture toughness due to Thermal aging embrittlement	Inservice inspection	No	NA	R-08
	Piping, piping components, and piping elements	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	BWR stress corrosion cracking and Water Chemistry	No	NA	R-20 R-21
	Reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) valve closure bolting,	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking	Bolting Integrity	No	NA	R-10 R-11 R-78
		Loss of material due to Wear	Bolting Integrity	No	NA	R-26 R-29 R-79



**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
	manway and holding bolting, and closure bolting in high-pressure and high-temperature systems	Loss of preload due to Stress relaxation	Bolting Integrity	No	NA	R-12 R-27 R-32 R-80
	Reactor vessel closure studs and stud assembly	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking	Reactor head closure studs	No	NA	R-71
		Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, intergranular stress corrosion cracking	Reactor head closure studs	No	NA	R-60
PWR	(Alloy 600) Steam generator tubes, repair sleeves, and plugs	Cracking due to Primary water stress corrosion cracking, intergranular attack, OD stress corrosion cracking, Denting due to corrosion of tube support plate, Loss of material due to fretting, wear, wastage, and pitting corrosion; Ligament cracking due to c	Steam generator tubing integrity; water chemistry	No	NA	R-40 R-44 R-47 R-48 R-49 R-50

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
	External surfaces of steel components in reactor coolant system pressure boundary	Loss of material due to Boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	No	NA	R-17
	Pressurizer integral support, Reactor coolant system piping, piping components, and piping elements	Cracking due to Cyclic loading	Inservice inspection	No	NA	R-19 R-56
	Reactor internals, reactor vessel flange	Loss of material due to Wear	Inservice inspection	No	NA	R-115 R-142 R-148 R-152 R-156 R-170 R-179 R-190 R-208 R-87
	Reactor vessel closure studs and stud assembly	Loss of material due to Wear	Reactor head closure studs	No	NA	R-72
	Reactor vessel nozzles safe ends and CRD housing; reactor coolant system components (except CASS and bolting)	Cracking due to Cyclic loading	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	No	NA	R-58
		Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	No	NA	R-25 R-30 R-76
			Inservice Inspection, Water chemistry, and RVI program commitment	No	NA	R-14

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
		Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking, primary water stress corrosion cracking	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	No	NA	R-07 R-83
	Steam generator secondary manways and handholds (steel)	Loss of material due to Erosion	Inservice inspection	No	NA	R-31
	Steam generator upper and lower heads; tubesheets; primary nozzles and safe ends	Cracking due to Stress corrosion cracking	Inservice inspection, and water chemistry	No	NA	R-35
	Steel tube support plate	Cracking due to Primary water stress corrosion cracking, intergranular attack, OD stress corrosion cracking, Denting due to corrosion of tube support plate, Loss of material due to fretting, wear, wastage, and pitting corrosion; Ligament cracking due to c	Steam generator tubing integrity; water chemistry	No	NA	R-42

**Table 3.1-1. Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System Evaluated in Chapter IV of the GALL Report**

Type	Component	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	Aging Management Programs	Further Evaluation Recommended	SRP Ref	Item Number in GALL
	Vessel internals (except Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts)	Loss of fracture toughness due to Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement, void swelling	Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	No	NA	R-111 R-140 R-153 R-171 R-183 R-191 R-206
		Loss of material due to Wear	Inservice inspection and recommendations of NRC IEB 88-09	No	NA	R-145
BWR/ PWR	Piping, piping components, and piping elements	None	None	NA - No AEM or AMP	NA - No AEM or AMP	RP-01 RP-02 RP-03 RP-04 RP-05 RP-06 RP-07 RP-08

**Table 3.1-2. FSAR Supplement for Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System**

Program	Description of Program	Implementation Schedule*
ISI	The program consists of periodic volumetric, surface, and/or visual examination of components and their supports for assessment, signs of degradation, and corrective actions. This program is in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1995 edition through the 1996 addenda.	Existing program
Water chemistry	To mitigate aging effects on component surfaces that are exposed to water as process fluid, chemistry programs are used to control water chemistry for impurities (e.g., chloride, fluoride, and sulfate) that accelerate corrosion. This program relies on monitoring and control of water chemistry to keep peak levels of various contaminants below the system-specific limits based on EPRI guidelines of TR-103515 for water chemistry in BWRs, TR-105714 for primary water chemistry in PWRs, and TR-102134 for secondary water chemistry in PWRs.	Existing program
One-time inspection	To verify the effectiveness of the water chemistry control program by determining if the aging effect is not occurring or the aging effect is progressing slowly so that the that the intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation, a one-time inspection of small-bore piping less than NPS 4, including pipe, fittings, and branch connections, using suitable techniques at the most susceptible locations is performed. Actual inspection locations should be based on physical accessibility, exposure levels, and NDE techniques, and locations identified in NRC IN 97-46.	Inspection should be completed before the period of extended operation.
Bolting integrity	This program consists of guidelines on materials selection, strength and hardness properties, installation procedures, lubricants and sealants, corrosion considerations in the selection and installation of pressure-retaining bolting for nuclear applications, and enhanced inspection techniques. This program relies on the bolting integrity program delineated in NUREG-1339 and industry's recommendations delineated in EPRI NP-5769, with the exceptions noted in NUREG-1339 for safety-related bolting and in EPRI TR-104213 for pressure retaining bolting and structural bolting.	Existing program

**Table 3.1-2. FSAR Supplement for Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System (continued)**

<b>Program</b>	<b>Description of Program</b>	<b>Implementation Schedule*</b>
Reactor vessel surveillance	Periodic testing of metallurgical surveillance samples is used to monitor the progress of neutron embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel as a function of neutron fluence, in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.99, Rev. 2.	The surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule should be revised before the period of extended operation.
Boric acid corrosion	The program consists of (1) visual inspection of external surfaces that are potentially exposed to borated water leakage, (2) timely discovery of leak path and removal of the boric acid residues, (3) assessment of the damage, and (4) follow-up inspection for adequacy. This program is implemented in response to GL 88-05.	Existing program
Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement of cast austenitic stainless steel	The program consists of (1) determination of the susceptibility of cast austenitic stainless steel components to thermal aging embrittlement, (2) accounting for the synergistic effects of thermal aging and neutron irradiation, and (3) implementing a supplemental examination program, as necessary.	Program should be implemented before the period of extended operation.
Reactor Head Closure Studs	This program includes inservice inspection ISI. For boiling water reactors (BWRs), this program also includes additional preventive actions and inspection techniques.	Existing program
Flow-accelerated corrosion	The program consists of the following: (1) conduct appropriate analysis and baseline inspection, (2) determine extent of thinning and replace/repair components, and (3) perform follow up inspections to confirm or quantify and take longer-term corrective actions. This program is in response to NRC GL 89-08.	Existing Program
Quality assurance	The 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B program provides for corrective actions, confirmation process, and administrative controls for aging management programs for license renewal. The scope of this existing program will be expanded to include nonsafety-related structures and components that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.	Program should be implemented before the period of extended operation.
Vessel closure head penetration	The program assesses degradation of CRD mechanism nozzle and other vessel closure head penetrations, and consists of a review of the scope and schedule of inspection, including the leakage detection system, to assure detection of cracks before the loss of intended function of the penetrations. This is in response to NRC GL 97-01.	Existing program

**Table 3.1-2. FSAR Supplement for Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System (continued)**

<b>Program</b>	<b>Description of Program</b>	<b>Implementation Schedule*</b>
BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle	The AMP monitors the effects of cracking on the intended function of the component by detection and sizing of cracks by ISI in accordance with the NUREG-0619 and alternative recommendation of GE NE-523-A71-0594. NUREG-0619 specifies UT of the entire nozzle and penetration testing (PT) of varying portions of the blend radius and bore. GE NE-523-A71-0594 specifies UT of specific regions of the blend radius and bore. UT techniques and personnel qualification are according to the guidelines of GE NE-523-A71-0594.	Program should be implemented before the period of extended operation.
Steam generator tube integrity	This program consists of SG inspection scope, frequency, acceptance criteria for the plugging and repair of flawed tubes in accordance with the plant technical specifications that includes commitments to NEI 97-06.	Existing program
Loose part monitoring	The program consists of loose part monitoring of reactor vessel and primary coolant systems in accordance with ASME OM-S/G-1997 standards. The program addresses methods, intervals, parameters to be measured and evaluated, and records requirements.	Existing program
Neutron noise monitoring	The program consists of neutron noise monitoring for the detection of loss of axial preload at the core support barrel's upper support flange, and can detect physical displacement and motion of reactor internals in accordance with ASME OM-S/G-1997 standards. The program addresses methods, intervals, parameters to be measured and evaluated, acceptance criteria, and records requirements.	Existing program
BWR Vessel Internals	The program includes (a) inspection and flaw evaluation in conformance with the guidelines of applicable and staff-approved boiling water reactor vessel and internals project (BWRVIP) documents and (b) monitoring and control of reactor coolant water chemistry in accordance with the guidelines of BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515) to ensure the long-term integrity and safe operation of boiling water reactor (BWR) vessel internal components.	Existing program
Plant-specific AMP	The description should contain information associated with the basis for determining that aging effects will be managed during the period of extended operation.	Program should be implemented before the period of extended operation.



**Table 3.1-2. FSAR Supplement for Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System (continued)**

<b>Program</b>	<b>Description of Program</b>	<b>Implementation Schedule*</b>
BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds	The program includes (a) inspection and flaw evaluation in conformance with the guidelines of staff-approved boiling water reactor vessel and internals project (BWRVIP)-48 and (b) monitoring and control of reactor coolant water chemistry in accordance with the guidelines of BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515).	
BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking	The program to manage intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in boiling water reactor (BWR) coolant pressure boundary piping made of stainless steel (SS) is delineated in NUREG-0313, Rev. 2, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter (GL) 88-01 and its Supplement 1. The program includes (a) preventive measures to mitigate IGSCC and (b) inspections to monitor IGSCC and its effects.	Existing program
BWR Penetrations	The program includes (a) inspection and flaw evaluation in conformance with the guidelines of staff-approved boiling water reactor vessel and internals project (BWRVIP)-49 and BWRVIP-27 documents and (b) monitoring and control of reactor coolant water chemistry in accordance with the guidelines of BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515) to ensure the long-term integrity and safe operation of boiling water reactor (BWR) vessel internal components.	Existing program
Nickel-Alloy Nozzles and Penetrations	The program includes (a) primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) susceptibility assessment to identify susceptible components, (b) monitoring and control of reactor coolant water chemistry to mitigate PWSCC, and (c) inservice inspection ISI of reactor vessel head penetrations to monitor PWSCC and its effect on the intended function of the component. For susceptible penetrations and locations, the program includes an industry wide, integrated, long-term inspection program based on the industry responses to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 97-01.	Existing program
Thermal Aging of Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel	This program includes (a) determination of the susceptibility of cast austenitic stainless steel components to thermal aging embrittlement and (b) for potentially susceptible components aging management is accomplished through either enhanced volumetric examination or plant- or component-specific flaw tolerance evaluation.	Existing program

**Table 3.1-2. FSAR Supplement for Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System (continued)**

Program	Description of Program	Implementation Schedule*
PWR Vessel Internals	The program includes (a) augmentation of the inservice inspection (ISI) to include enhanced VT-1 examinations of non-bolted components, and other demonstrated acceptable methods for bolted components for certain susceptible or limiting components or locations, and (b) monitoring and control of reactor coolant water chemistry in accordance with the EPRI guidelines in TR-105714 to ensure the long-term integrity and safe operation of pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessel internal components.	Program should be implemented before the period of extended operation.
BWR Feedwater Nozzle	This program includes (a) enhancing inservice inspection (ISI) specified in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section XI, with the recommendation of General Electric (GE) NE-523-A71-0594 to perform periodic ultrasonic testing inspection of critical regions of the BWR feedwater nozzle.	Existing program
<p>* An applicant need not incorporate the implementation schedule into its FSAR. However, the reviewer should verify that the applicant has identified and committed in the license renewal application to any future aging management activities to be completed before the period of extended operation. The staff expects to impose a license condition on any renewed license to ensure that the applicant will complete these activities no later than the committed date.</p>		

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